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I. INTRODUCTION

Walking along the Avenue Auderghem in the government district of
Brussels, Belgium, a casual onlooker will be greeted by numerous
impressive structures, art de noveaux in style, housing some of the most
important institutions of the European Union. The recently completed
European Parliament (Parliament) crests a small rise, its facade of glass
windows sparkling in the sunlight, signaling the growing importance of
this quasi-legislative body. Moving along the sidewalks, one sees various
other E.U. governmental bodies, directorates and institutions. As the road
rises again, a large, unassuming structure stands stoically along the road
opposite the Parliament. Lacking the attraction of its neighboring cohort,
*
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an ordinary passerby would likely assume it to be another random office
building, unknowing of what goes on inside the pink-washed walls, unsure
of its actual significance to the Brussels process. Identify the building as
the home of the European Commission (Commission), confusion and
perplexity will likely continue to persist.
A tour of this important E.U. institution unveils more questions than
answers. Entering through the main doors, one assumes they are on the
first floor, when in fact the lifts reveal the number 5 as the point of entry.
In many ways, the best thing to do at this point is walk out and not look
back, for the adventurous soul who presses one of the buttons to be taken
to another floor and enters an office of the Commission will only find
more uncertainty. Constituting one of the many strange and
unconventional governing bodies of the European Union, the Commission
plays the role of a peculiar hybrid of an executive and civil service.
Composed of representatives from each member state, the role of the
Commission is often ambiguous and unclear. Yet, while its functions and
duties remain the subject of obscurity, changes remain in store for a new
Commission.
As the European Union eyes the incorporation of many eastern, excommunist states into its membership, the size and policymaking
procedures of all E.U. institutions stand in need of an overhaul. A recent
2001 summit on the shores of the French coast resulted in a new
agreement for the necessary chanfes and restructuring needed for an
enlarged union. The Treaty of Nice encompasses this new blueprint, but
while many questions found answers, many more uncertainties were
revealed. Recognizing the many uncertainties in the future of the
Commission, this Article analyzes the effects of the Treaty of Nice on the
Commission, and the problems left unanswered in this latest design. Part
I provides a brief background on the European Union and the pending
plans for enlargement, while Part II analyzes the role of the Commission
and its composition before and after the Treaty of Nice. Finally, Part III
discusses the problems and questions left unanswered under the Treaty of
Nice as to the composition and functioning of the Commission in an
enlarged European Union.

1. TREATY OF NICE AMENDING THE TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 3, 2001 O.J. (C
80) 1 (200 1) [hereinafter TREATY OF NICE] (where a second vote was held in October 2002). See
Snore, Snore: The EU's Sleepy Summit and After, ECONOMIST, June 29, 2002. See Ratification
Situation, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/nicetreaty/ratiftable-en.pdf (last visited
Dec. 5, 2002) (for information on the ratification of the Treaty ofNice in individual member states).
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II. THE EUROPEAN UNION: WHERE IT CAME
FROM AND WHERE IT IS GOING

The dawn of World War II and the beginning of the end of centuries of
fighting in Europe spurred many ideas and propositions aimed to prevent
violent conflicts in the future. Ultimately, calls for an economically
integrated Europe prevailed, resulting in the founding of the European
Communities in the 1950s, 2 composed of Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 3 Waves of expansion occurred
throughout the next forty years with the accession of the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in
1986, and Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995." Formally established in
1992 under the Treaty of Maastrict,5 the European Union is founded upon
three pillars: the first incorporating the three communities, 6 the second
encompassing a common foreign and security policy,' and the third
addressing member state cooperation on justice and home affairs within
the Union.8
As to be expected under a framework where fifteen states concede their
sovereignty over numerous economic and social matters, the institutional
structure of the European Union is complex and inefficient. 9 Composed of
five different governing bodies with overlapping functions and an intricate
system of checks and balances, the law-making system of the European
Union remains perplexing. For purposes of this Article, the following
descriptions will suffice: the European Council (Council) fulfills the
2. See Thomas M.J. Mollers, The Role ofLaw in European Integration,48 AM. J.COMP. L.
679,680 (2000) (stating that the establishment of the European Economic Community spurred from
a driving desire for peace and fifty years of peaceful coexistence on a continent that fought
countless battles throughout the centuries remains without parallel).
3. CHRISTOPHER BRIGHT, THE EU: UNDERSTANDING THE BRUSSELS PROCESS: THE
ESSENTIAL FACTS 2 (1995). The European Coal and Steel Community integrated the coal and steel
markets of the six member states in 1952, followed by the creation of the European Atomic Energy
Community and the European Economic Community in 1957. Id.
4. Id. at 3.
5. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992) [hereinafter TREATY OF
MAASTRICT].

6. The three communities of the first pillar of the European Union include the European
Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic
Community. See European Treaties, availableat http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/treatiesen.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2002).
7. BRIGHT, supra note 3, at 3.
8. See id.; see generally D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 22-26 (4th ed. 1987).
9. Christoph Henkel, The Allocation of Powers in the European Union: A Closer Look at
the Principle of Subsidiary,20 BERKLEY J.INT'L LAW 359, 385 (2002).
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and law-making role; ° the Commission serves an executive and

civil service function and proposes legislation to the Council;"1 the

Parliament acts as an advisor and supervisor for the other institutions; 2 the
Court of Justice serves as the supreme judicial authority on Community
law issues;" and the Court of Auditors 4 acts as a financial watchdog over
all of the E.U. institutions. 5 Presently, the membership of the European
Union stands at fifteen member states, though the door stands open for
new members to join. 6
Enlargement continues to present an important issue for the member
states of the European Union. 7 With a view to unify the entire continent
under the three pillars, membership in the European Union remains open

10. BRIGHT, supra note 3, at 4; see also Council of the European Union, available at
http://ue.eu.int/en/info/mainl.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) (official web site of the European
Council).
11. BRIGHT, supra note 3, at 4; see also European Commission, available at http://www.
europa.eu.int/comm/indexen.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) (official web site of the European
Commission).
12. BRIGHT, supra note 3, at 4; see also European Parliament, available at http://www.euro
parl.eu.int/home/defaulten.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) (official web site of the European
Parliament).
13. BRIGHT, supra note 3, at 4; see also Court of Justice and a Court for Europe, available
at http://curia.eu.int/en/pres/jeu.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) (official web site of the Court of
Justice and Court of First Instance of the European Union).
14. BRIGHT, supra note 3, at 4; see also European Court of Auditors, available at http://
www.eca.eu.int/EN/menu.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) (official web site of the European Court
of Auditors).
15. BRIGHT, supra note 3, at 4.
16. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2,1997,

O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]. Under Article 49:
Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(l) may apply
to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council,
which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving
the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of
its component members.
The Conditions of admission and the adjustments of the Treaties on which the
Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement
shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with
their respective constitutional requirements.
Id. art. 49.
17. See, e.g., Alexander Somek, On Supranationality, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 23,24-25 (2001).
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to all European states meeting certain economic and political criteria."
Waves of enlargement raised Union membership from six states in the
beginning to its present membership of fifteen. Significant progress is
being made in the new wave of expansion regarding former communist
states in Eastern Europe with negotiations involving ten candidate
countries set to conclude at the end of 2002 with Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lativa, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak
Republic, and Solvenia, raising membership to twenty-five member
states. 9 The Commission predicts these states will be ready for full
membership by the beginning of 2004 and able to take part in the
Parliament's elections that year.2° Further, Bulgaria and Romania are
aiming for membership by 2007,2 while numerous other states including
Turkey,22 the European Free Trade Agreement countries of Iceland,
Norway, and Switzerland, five western Balkan states, and various other
former Soviet Union states may attempt accession in the future.23 Thus, the
potential remains for the European Union to grow to upwards of forty
member states within the next twenty years.24
Supporters cite several benefits resulting from an enlarged Union.2 5
These include the extension of peace, stability and prosperity in the
enhancement of European security, an increase of millions of people to the

18. See, e.g., Carson W. Clements, Note, A More Perfect Union? Eastern Enlargement and
the Institutional Challenges of the Czech Republic's Accession to the European Union, 29
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 401, 415 (2002).
19. Press Release, European Commission, Towards the Enlarged Union - Commission
Recommends Conclusion of Negotiations with Ten Candidate Countries (Oct. 9, 2002), available
at http://www.delkor.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/14430RAPID.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2002).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. This October 9, 2002 press release by the Commission ignited a controversy over
whether Turkish membership in the European Union would ever be possible or occur. See Too Big
for Europe? The Turks are the Gates of Brussels, ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 2002 (for discussions of
this debate); Fareed Zakaria, Europe's Campaign Against Turkey, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002.
Statements by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, former French president and president of the Convention
on the Future of Europe, to the effect that those advocating Turkish membership are "enemies of
Europe" and that Turkish admission would mean "the end of Europe," have further escalated the
situation. Id
23. Markus G. Puder, Salade Nicoise FromAmsterdam Left-Overs-Does the Treaty ofNice
Contain the Institutional Recipe to Ready the European Union for Enlargement?, 8 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 53, 60-61 (2002).
24. See id.
25. Explaining Europe's Enlargement: Report from the Commission to the Council, EuR.
PARL. Doc. (COM 281 final) 2 (2002) (analyzing the challenges and benefits of the enlargement
of the European Union).
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E.U.
and the
strengthening of the E.U.'s power and influence in world affairs.2" Yet,
these benefits present many organizational and institutional difficulties,
problems that will need to be addressed in conferences and treaties in
future years.29
The first of these progressive agreements aimed at revamping the
structural workings of the European Union is the 2001 Treaty of Nice.30
Addressing issues left unresolved during the preceding intergovernmental
conference resulting in the Treaty of Amsterdam," the Treaty of Nice
focuses on issues arising out of the eminent wave of expansion that will
raise Union membership to twenty-seven by 2004, namely the size and
composition of the Commission and measures regarding voting in the
Council. These and other matters are designed to make E.U. institutions.
more effective, efficient, and transparent amidst a more diverse and
variegated government. However, the limits of the Treaty of Nice and the
many unanswered questions will soon become apparent and induce
successive changes and reforms over the years to come.32

26. See generally R.Stehrer Landesmann, The CEECs in the EnlargedEurope: Convergence
Patterns, Specialisation, andLabour Market Implications, available at http://titan.wsr.ac.at:8880/
wiiwsite.show one abstract?pdoctype=2603 (last visited Sept. 21, 2002).
27. See, e.g., FINANCIAL SECTORS IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES (Christian Thimann ed.,
2002), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/financialsectorseuaccession.pdf (last visited Nov.
8, 2002); Information Note: The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement,
available at http://www.europa.eu.intcomm/enlargement/docs/pdf/migration-enl.pdf(last visited
Oct. 21, 2002).
28. See Enlargement: The Basic Arguments, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/arguments/index.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002); see also Fred 0. Williams, Change
in the E. U; European Union Offers Opportunity, Risky for Exporters,BUFFALO

NEWS,

Jan. 25,

2002, available at 2002 WL 7417180; Europe's Magnetic Attraction: The Enlargement of the
European Union Presents a Big but Necessary Risk, says Gideon Rachman, ECONOMIST, May 19,
2001, available at 2001 WL 7319027.
29. See The Limits ofEurope: Where Will itAll End?, ECONOMIST, May 19,2001, available
at 2001 WL 7319022.
30. See F.T. McCarthy, Still Broken: The Nice Treaty and Decision Making, ECONOMIST,
June, 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7319269.
31. See Giuseppe C. Azzi, Better Lawmaking: The Experience and the View ofthe European
Commission, 4 COLUM. J.EUR. L. 617, 618 (1998).
32. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 30; see also F.T. McCarthy, So That 'sAllAgreed, Then:
What Nice Achieved, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8144911.
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III. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE TREATY OF NICE:

How

WILL IT LOOK?

A. The Commission Under the E.C. Treaty
Constituting the most visible and, consequently, most maligned E.U.
institution, the Commission acts essentially as the initiator and coordinator
of Community legislation.33 Supervising the application and
implementation of such legislation and Community policies, the
Commission serves to secure the four tenants of the Community, namely
the "free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons throughout the
' The Commission further "ensure[s] that the
territory of the Union."34
benefits of integration are balanced between countries and regions,
between businesses and consumers and between different categories of
'
citizens."35
Articles 211-219 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(E.C. Treaty) currently address the composition and functions of the
Commission.36 Under Article 211, the Commission is charged with four
functions:
[1.]
[2.]
[3.]
[4.]

ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures
taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied;
formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters
dealt with in this Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the
Commission considers it necessary;
have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping
of measures taken by the Council and by the European
Parliament in the manner provided for in this Treaty;
exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the
implementation of the rules laid down by the latter.3 7

Based on the first category, the Commission is often referred to as the
Guardian of the Treaty, involving the monitoring of member state activity
33. See Role of the European Commission, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/roleen.
htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY, Nov. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1
(1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. The European Union designated the original Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community arising out of the Treaty of Rome as the E.C. Treaty.
37. Id. art. 211.
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and ensuring the implementation of Community obligations." This task
entails receiving complaints from individuals and companies regarding
infringements of Community law and investigating these allegations. In
the event an infraction is found, the Commission may use various
mechanisms to bring member states into compliance through infringement
proceedings, and, if necessary, bring suit before the European Court of
Justice.39

The second charge of the E.C. Treaty encompasses the opinion and
recommendation function of the Commission.4 ° This involves the drafting
and compilation of numerous communications sent each year by the
Commission to the Parliament and Council on proposed and effective
Community legislation.4' Constituting an important function, these actions
taken by the Commission help ensure legality and consistency between the
E.C. Treaty and Community law.
The legislative powers of the Commission fall under the third category,
whereby the Commission wields its power of decision and participation in
the preparation and adoption of Community measures.42 The Commission
maintains the important and exclusive function of initiating legislation,a
privilege absent from the Parliament's authority.43 Further, the power of
decision by the Commission is exercised in various areas, including
competition policy and agriculture, where the Commission investigates
infringements in the former and establishes regulations and procedures for
price fixing in the latter." The final category under the E.C. Treaty simply
refers to powers over matters delegated by the Council to the
Commission.4
Articles 213-219 of the E.C. Treaty address the size and composition
of the Commission. Under its current form, the Commission consists of
twenty members, "chosen on the grounds of general competence and
whose independence is beyond doubt."46 Subject to the stipulation that one
national from each member state serve on the Commission, with a limit of
two members from the same state, the ten smaller states are represented by
one Commissioner while the five largest member states of the European
Union are currently served by two members of the Commission, namely
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See TOM KENNEDY, LEARNING EUROPEAN LAW 66 (1998); see also EC TREATY art. 211.
See id. at 66-67.
See EC TREATY art. 211.
See KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 66-67.
See id. at 67; see also EC TREATY art. 211.
See KENNEDY, supra note 38, at 67.
See id.; see also LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 8, at 188-94.
EC TREATY art. 211.
Id. art. 213.
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France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.47 Commission

members are required to be fully independent and prohibited from
receiving instructions from their own states or engaging in any other
occupation during their tenure, which currently stands as a five-year
renewable term of office.4 Led by a domestic President and one or two
domestic Vice Presidents, the Commission acts by secret majority vote and
in practice functions as a collegiate body and the institution collectively,
not the individual Commissioners, bears the responsibility for acts taken
by the Commission.49
A high degree of specialization exists among the Commission, where
special responsibilities are conferred upon each Commissioner.5 ° The
Commission is currently composed of twenty-three Directorates General
and several services or departments overseeing specific policy areas
ranging from agriculture to transportion. 51 Each Commissioner serves in
one or more policy areas52 throughout his term and oversees the operation
of their respective Directorates, with a cabinet of personal political
advisers serving as a link in the operation. 3
The Commission, comprised of twenty Commissioners serving the
fifteen member states of the European Union, constitutes a
legislative/executive/civil service-hybrid aimed at representing the Union
and the E.C. Treaty among the member states. However, the enlargement
of the European Union to twenty-seven members emanates many
complexities as to the size and composition of an enlarged Commission.
The Treaty of Nice attempts to address these issues.
B. The Commission Under the Treaty of Nice

Past enlargements of the European Union presented few problems in
regards to the composition of the Commission. The accession of the
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland in 1973 raised the number of
Commissioners from nine to thirteen (two slots for the United Kingdom).
Subsequent accessions followed the same suit of adding an additional seat
for every new member state, raising the Commission membership number
to its current size of twenty in 1995. If past trends continued, the
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

BRIGHT, supra note

3, at 26; see EC TREATY art. 211.
See ECTREATY arts. 213, 214.
See id. arts. 214, 217.
LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 8, at 186.
For specific information regarding each of the policy areas overseen by the Commission,

see generally European Commission, supra note 11.
52. BRIGHT, supra note 3, at 27. Directorates-General include, among others, External
Economic Relations, Industry, Competition, Agriculture, Energy, and Budgets. Id.

53. Id.
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Commission would be composed of upwards of thirty-two to thirty-three
Commissioners by 2004, following the next round of accession. While
efficiency and productivity seem somewhat absent in the current
Commission of twenty, expanding the Commission to thirty-three
ultimately spells gridlock and fragmentation on its face, without even
accounting for the cultural and political discrepancies that will likely result
from the Eastern Europe enlargement. In such an event, the Commission
would serve less like an efficient executive and more like a general
assembly.54 Further, "[tihe prospect of future enlargements also raises
fears that increasing the number of Commissioners will further the trend
towards nationalization of the office at the expense of collective
responsibility."55 In contrast, any limits on the size of the Commission
would result in under representation of member states denied a
Commission seat, i.e. over-representation ofsmaller states like Cyprus and
Malta, with populations of less than one million, in contrast to states such
as France and the United Kingdom, with populations of sixty million,
where each state would likely hold only one seat.56 In essence, the
challenges posed to Commission reformation surround the concept of
determining the optimal size and composition necessary to ensure
"legitimacy, collective responsibility, and efficiency of the institution.""
The Treaty of Nice set out to accomplish such objectives, though in the
end, uncertainties remain abundant and the future remains unclear. In an
annexed Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union,5" the
negotiators at Nice sought an airtight compromise between the larger and
smaller member states on the size and composition of the Commission.
According to Article 4.1, on January 1, 2005, Commission seats will be
capped according to the number of member states, with each member state
being represented by one national.59 Accordingly, the five largest states
currently holding two seats will lose a commissioner while the acceding
member states will each gain a seat. This provision remains subject to
modification by the Council, which by a unanimous decision, may change
the number of Commission members without amending the treaty.6"
54. See generally Xenophon A. Yataganas, The Treaty ofNice: The Sharing Power and the
InstitutionalBalance in the European Union-A ContinentalPerspective, available at www.jean

monnetprogram.org/papers/01/10101 .html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
55. See Puder, supra note 23, at 64.
56. Id. at 64.
57. Id. at 65.
58. Protocol to the Treaty of Nice on the Enlargement of the European Union, Oct. 3, 2001,
O.J. (C 80) 49 (2001) [hereinafter Protocol on Enlargement].
59. Id. arts. 4.1, 4.2.
60. Id. art. 4.1.
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However, Article 4.1 may not be needed if enlargement proceeds
according to plan and all twelve negotiating states accede before 2005.
Article 4.2 provides that when the number of member states in the Union
reaches twenty-seven, "the number of Members of the Commission shall
be less than the number of Member States."' At such time, the Council is
charged with the responsibility of establishing a set number of
Commissioners with seats chosen according to a rotation system.62
The Nice Treaty charges the Council with the delicate and complex
task of determining the size and composition of the Commission in an
enlarged Union. The outcome will come primarily through the design of
the rotation system, which the Nice Treaty mandates to be based upon the
principal of equality and must contain criteria and rules necessary for
automatically determining the make-up of successive colleges.63
Accordingly, the Council must treat member states equally in determining
the sequence and terms of Commissioners and never allow the total
number of terms of any two member states to differ by more than one. 4
Subject to these stipulations, the Council must take into account
demographic and geographic range and satisfactorily compose each
successive college of the Commission accordingly.65

In essence, the language and formulations described in the Treaty of
Nice reflect a delicate compromise between the various sized member
states, as well as an attempt to buy time over the coming years to reform
and phase-in institutional improvements within the Commission.' The
discord among the ten states currently holding one seat and the five states
holding two ultimately resulted in the maintaining of the status quo until
2005.67 At such time, the larger states will lose a seat and all member states

will be represented by one commissioner each.60 However, the accession
of the twenty-seventh state underscores the ambiguity of the Treaty of
Nice and the future of the Commission. While the Treaty of Nice
establishes a sort of egalitarian-based rotation system, the intricate details
of such a method remain vague and ambiguous, and essentially
unresolved.69 This is evidenced by the fact that the size of such a

Commission is not established, nor are the arrangements for a rotation."0
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. art. 4.2.
Id.
Protocol on Enlargement art. 4.3.
Id.

65. Id.

66. See Puder, supra note 23, at 65-66.
67. See Protocol on Enlargement art. 4.1.
68. See id.
69. See id. arts. 4.2, 4.3
70. See id.
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In effect, the fact that these decisions remain open for Council decision
and adoption reflects the need for more political solidarity on ideas
ranging from organizational reforms that seek to ensure member state
participation in the Commission regardless of whether a state currently
holds a Commission seat to proposals that will maintain adequate
population-based representation. Indeed, while Nice certainly provides a
framework for the future of the Commission, the framework may best be
described as a skeleton with many holes and gaps in need of completion.
IV. THE PROBLEMS AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS UNDER THE TREATY
OF NICE AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

"Unfinished" may best characterize the Commission envisioned under
the Treaty of Nice. While the Treaty of Nice certainly describes what the
Commission will not look like upon the accession of the twenty-seventh
member state of the European Union, the Treaty of Nice does little to
depict what the Commission will look like." In sum, two main issues
remain unresolved and in need of clarification before a European Union
of twenty-seven states can be realized: the size and composition of
Commission seats and the functioning of the proposed rotation system.
The following section will analyze these problems and discuss possible
solutions to the problems of an enlarged Commission.
A. Commission Seats: Who Gets One?
Equal participation constitutes perhaps the most fundamental aspect of
institutional legitimacy in regards to E.U. institutions. Member states of
the European Union each forfeit a certain amount of national sovereignty
to the Brussels process, thereby subverting their own national institutions
to the will of the European Union as a whole. Representation serves to
ensure participation in the decision-making processes that result in the
rules and regulations governing commerce and affecting the lives of each
European citizen. Representation guarantees that these rules and
regulations are followed by the member states, while serving to legitimize
the institutions themselves and the European Union as a whole. If
representation and participation of member states in these processes is
abridged, the legitimacy of the European Union will be at issue.
The aspect of ensuring representation and participation is fundamental
to maintaining the legitimacy and lawfulness of the Commission.
However, such aspirations must be balanced with the need for efficiency
71. See generally id. art. 4.
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and productivity. On average, the Commission makes about two hundred
decisions every week.72 While the case for equal representation could be
made for allowing every member state to maintain one Commission seat,
the practicality of such an argument does not coincide with the need for
proficiency." A Commission of upwards of forty Commissioners could
not operate efficiently, as decisions would take longer given the increased
input of diverging political and social ideologies and viewpoints.'
Conversely, how can the Commission operate legitimately in the eyes of
all European citizens if every citizen is not represented in the decisions of
this important institution by one of their own nationals?
The cynic would argue that Commissioners represent the European
Union and not the member states.' Yet, while this argument remains valid
and each Commissioner's loyalty to the European Union above their
respective home states is rarely suspected, the questions arising from the
Treaty of Nice highlight the importance of individual member state
representation. For example, why did the matter over the size of the
Commission and representation therein present such a contentious issue in
Nice and why has the matter been deferred to the Council for future
determination when a decision will be absolutely necessary? The fact
remains that Commissioners are viewed as national representatives to the
European Union in most member states, a concept that will certainly cause
conflict if and when these national representatives lose their seats.76
Thus, the issue remains how to balance the need for representation with
the need for efficiency and productivity in an enlarged Commission. The
complexity of the argument underscores the intricacy of the answer, for
only a hybrid approach will ensure that both of these are met. First of all,
the number of Commission seats needs to be capped in the mid-twenties,
but weighed proportionate to the number of member states. For example,
72. The European Commission, Adapting the Institutions to Make a Success of Enlargement,
Commission Opinion in Accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on the European Union on the
Calling of a Conference of Representative of the Governments of the Member States to Amend the
Treaties, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 34) 11 (2000).

73. Cf id.
74. Cf id.
75. Article 213 of the EC Treaty provides:
The Members of the Commission, shall, in the general interest of the Community,
be completely independent in the performance of their duties. In the performance
of these duties, they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government
or from any other body. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their

duties.
EC TREATY art. 213(2).
76. See Puder, supra note 23, at 64-65.
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a European Union of twenty-seven should not exclude two members with
a twenty-five member cap, but should be proportionately smaller.
Conversely, a Union of forty will need more than twenty commissioners,
as half of the member states should not be excluded. A number in the
capped range will ensure the relative proficiency maintained by the current
Commission, while opening the door for additional membership and
representation through the rotation system.
Equal participation may be effectively accomplished under the
proposed Senior/Junior and Vice Commissioner models, whereby all
member states will be given access to the decision-making process of the
Commission through organizational reforms, making the college
hierarchical."" Modifications would continue to be made under the current
collective responsibility principal.7 Under the Senior/Junior approach,
levels of voting and non-voting Commissioners would be established and
the Commission would operate similar to a business partnership. Thus,
non-voting Junior Commissioners could engage in aspects ofthe decisionmaking and bureaucratic processes without hindering the efficiency of the
institution. 0 Similarly, the Vice Commissioner model politicizes the
Directors-General heading the Directorates to allow them to assume
political and representative functions on behalf of the Commission to third
countries and the public.8
The solution for Commission seating most certainly lies within a
hybrid model. Such a model would cap the number of Commissioners and
allow for member state participation vis-A-vis institutional reforms,
creating meaningful positions for member state representatives not holding
a voting seat during a given college. In actuality, this may be the only way
to address the concerns of maintaining an efficient executive composed of
representatives from all member states of the Union.
B. The Rotation System: How Will it Turn?
The Treaty ofNice establishes the framework for an egalitarian system
to rotate Commission seats in an enlarged Union." Although hedged in
terms of strictly equal-footing, the rotation system remains open to
influence by geographic and demographic determinations. 3 In fact, this
discord in the Treaty ofNice represents the accepted compromise position,
77. Id. at 67.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id.
See id.
See id
See Puder, supra note 23, at 67.
Protocol on Enlargement art. 4.
Id. art. 4.3.
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by which the larger member states may be able to avoid being affected by
rotations in actual practice.
If population does not factor into the rotation equation, the Council
could simply take the member states, assign the available Commission
seats for the first college to the top part of the list, and follow a rotation
system where the ones left out would be part of the subsequent college.
For example, in a European Union of twenty-eight states and twenty-one
Commission seats, the system could rotate states in and out in sets of
seven, whereby a state would have a seat for three successive terms and sit
out the forth. However, the mere fact that this proposal is so democratic
makes it problematic. Specifically, under such a system not accounting for
population, the exclusion of any one of the seven largest member states
(Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Turkey)
would by itself take away representation of between 8% (Poland) to 17%
(Germany) of the E.U. population." However, not granting a Commission
seat to one of the six smaller states (Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia,
Slovenia, and Latvia) would only entail not representing 0.1% (Malta and
Luxembourg) to 0.5% (Latvia) of the Union.85 Thus, a system should be
devised with population numbers in mind so that a majority of European
nationals have representation during each successive Commission college.
Several proposals could accomplish such an end. One system would
involve non-rotating seats for the seven larger states, with the rotation
system working only for the smaller states. Given the size discrepancies
between the largest E.U. state of Germany, with a population of eighty-two
million, and the smallest states of Malta and Luxembourg, with
populations of four hundred thousand respectively, an argument for such
a system seems logical.8 6 A clear line between larger and smaller states
could be drawn between Poland and Romania, where the difference in
population is between 38.7 million and 22.5 million, or 8.0% and 4.7% of
the Union population respectively.87 Variations on this idea could establish
five or six permanent seats for the six or seven larger member states,
whereby a rotation system would filter one or two states in and out at
every college.
The main problem the Council will encounter when trying to balance
the need for ensuring larger state representation with the criteria of the
Treaty of Nice will be the language of Article 4.3(a) of the Protocol on
Enlargement. Article 4.3 (a) limits the difference in terms of office between
84. See Edward Best, The Treaty ofNice: Not Beautiful but It'll Do, EIPASCOPE, 2001/1, at
3, 4, available at http://www.eipa.nl (last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
85. See id. at 4 tbl. 1.
86. See id. at 4.
87. See id.
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any two members to no more than one."8 This will be easily overcome in
the interim period, when the size of the European Union remains at thirty
member states or less, but more problems will be encountered as
membership increases to upwards of forty. 9 These issues will involve
political discord among the larger Western European states who make up
the original founders of the European Union and the newly initiated larger
and smaller states of Eastern Europe that will seemingly threaten the
founders' representation and control of institutional bodies like the
Commission. However, at least under the Treaty of Nice, a firewall exists
for the larger member states in the form of the Council where a modified
qualified majority voting system will remain in effect upon enlargement.90
Under this system, the larger states may act in concert to block any
Council decision regarding the rotation system that might undermine their
representation in the Commission.9
The future of the composition of the Commission and the rotation
system utilized to fill its seats remains less than clear under the Treaty of
Nice. However, the one thing that remains clear is that the decision on the
rotation system is being saved for another day. That decision was
delegated by the Treaty of Nice negotiators to the Council for further
debate and resolution.92
C. Other PossibleSolutions
While the Treaty of Nice contemplates the size and composition
problems facing an enlarged Commission, other possible organizational
improvements could be enacted to address these numerous concerns. One
solution would overhaul the Commission to allow it to function more like
an executive branch of government. 93 Under such a scenario, the President
of the Commission would operate in the capacity of a chief executive,
fashioning the size and composition of the college himself in order to meet
the needs and demands of the Commission.94 Rather than assigning
Commission seats based on nationality and a rotation system, the
diplomatic attitude of the president would control.95 Such a system would
serve to increase the powers of the Commission President and enhance the
legitimacy of the post through a European-wide election, or appointment
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Protocol on Enlargement art. 4.3(a).
See id.
See generally TREATY OF NICE.
See Protocol on Enlargement art. 3.
See generally id.
See Puder, supra note 23, at 67-68.
Id. at 67.
See id.
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by the Parliament.96 A similar approach would involve the Parliament
playing an increased role in the election of Commissioners through direct
elections by the Parliament, thereby removing much of the national color
of the Commission.97 Under both models, the supranational character and
legitimacy of the institution could be enhanced significantly, while the
reorganization would make the Commission more reflective of the
executive models prevailing in most member states.9"
Another possibility for adapting the Commission to the enlargement of
the European Union would be to change the majority voting system
currently utilized to a qualified majority model." Similar to the voting
system utilized by the Council, where the votes of member states are
weighted according to population and a threshold number of votes are
required for a motion to pass, the Commission could incorporate this
model and allow an even greater amount of participation."° Under such a
system, Commission seats would not necessarily need to be limited and
proficiency might not have to be sacrificed. However, such a proposal
drastically changes the underlying purposes and functions of the
Commission, and for those reasons alone, may not be an acceptable idea. 01
The fact remains that much work is left to be done before the
Commission in a European Union of over twenty-seven members can
function. Many alternatives and directions exist for the Commission to
take, which should contribute significantly to the debate that will unfold
in the interim years before a final decision is necessary. The year-long
Convention on the Future of the European Union that began in March of
2002 will provide such a forum. ° In many ways, time is on the side of the
European Union in this matter, and according to the underlying
procrastination found in the Treaty of Nice, European Union leaders are
very much aware of this fact."13

96. Id.
97. See id. at 68.
98. See Puder, supra note 23, at 67-68.
99. The European Council currently operates under a qualified-majority voting scheme when
voting on certain issues. For a description of the allocation of votes. See EC TREATY art. 205.
100. See id.
101. See generally EC TREATY arts. 213-217.
102. ConstituentAssemblyforEurope, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Dec. 16,2001, available
at 2001 WL 31967659.
103. See generally European Convention, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/
bienvenue.asp?lang=EN (last visited Oct. 29, 2002).
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V. CONCLUSION

Viewing the E.U. institutions on Avenue Auderghem in Brussels often
creates the temptation for the average visitor to attempt to analogize the
structures and functions of these governmental bodies with that of their
own national governments. However, just as the first floor of the
Commission building is actually the fifth floor, such conceptualizations
present traps for the unwary. As the European Union itself constitutes an
unprecedented and remarkable experiment of securing peace and
prosperity through the economic and political integration of independent
polities, the institutions themselves reflect the delicate balance and
symmetry necessary for such a system to function. This results in much
confusion and uncertainty as to what the institutions actually do and how
they operate, especially evident in the mixed hybrid system found in the
Commission.
The expansion of the European Union and the goal for complete
unification of Europe reflect the success of the experiment so far, while
past enlargements pay tribute to the ability of the European Union to adapt
and adjust to change. Perhaps the most dangerous trap for any analysis
involving the European Union may be viewing the European Union as a
completed work, when in fact it is a work in progress, a polity in
formation. The Treaty of Nice represents one of many adjustments and
modifications made to the original Communities established some fifty
years ago, and while it may be less than perfect and leaves many questions
unanswered, such is the nature of progress and the personality of the
European Union itself.
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